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EXPLAINING THE ILLUSION OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Daniel Shabasson 
DanShab@live.com 
 
 
 
According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness does not exist.  There is nothing “it 
is like” to see red or feel pain.  Most people find illusionism highly counterintuitive and it 
remains a minority view among philosophers. To increase its intuitive plausibility, we 
proponents of illusionism must solve what Keith Frankish (2016) has termed the illusion 
problem. We must explain why phenomenal consciousness seems to exist and why the illusion 
that it exists is so powerful. Focusing on introspective judgments about our color experiences, I 
propose a theory to solve the illusion problem.  
 I make several working assumptions in this paper.  With Frankish (2012), I adhere to 
strong illusionism and I shall suppose that there are no viable “diet” conceptions of qualia 
lacking any of the three characteristics of what Frankish calls classic qualia—intrinsicality, 
ineffability, and subjectivity. Thus, I use “qualia” exclusively to refer to classic qualia, and one 
of my aims will be to explain why we erroneously attribute these three characteristics of classic 
qualia to our experiences.  I also adopt the working assumption that qualia do not exist.  I beg no 
question in doing so, for I do not seek to prove, in the first instance, that qualia do not exist.  
Instead, I seek to answer the following question: if qualia did not exist, could we nevertheless 
plausibly explain our powerful disposition to judge that they do? To examine this question, we 
must adopt the working assumption that qualia do not exist.  If we manage to expound a 
plausible theory to explain the disposition that does not posit the existence of qualia, we can then 
decide between that theory and qualia realism according to the relative explanatory power of 
each.  
Some proponents of illusionism maintain that we will need to make significant advances 
in neurology and cognitive science and learn more about the brain before we can hope to 
understand the causes of the illusion. But I think this is mistaken. I intend to show here that we 
can already understand the general causes of the illusion—even if important details may need to 
be filled in—based on three principles. The first principle (section 1) is “Impenetrability,” 
according to which we have no introspective or conscious access to the processes in our brains, 
operating sub-doxastically, that engender our introspective judgments about our sensory 
experiences, nor do we have access to the non-phenomenal (functional, neural, or physical) 
properties of our experiences that our brains sub-doxastically apprehend to engender our 
introspective judgments about our sensory experiences. The second principle (section 2), the 
“Infallibility Intuition,” is our strong disposition to judge our introspective judgments about our 
sensory experiences to be infallible, or impervious to doubt.1 The third principle (section 3) is the 
“Justification Intuition,” an epistemic constraint on judgment/belief. For any agent a judging p, it 
must seem to a that she is justified in judging that p at the time she judges that p. Thus, the patent 
absurdity/incoherence of a saying or thinking: p, but I have no reason to judge/hold/believe p.  In 
section 4, I show that we can explain the illusion of phenomenal consciousness based on these 
three principles.   
 
 
                                               
1 I use “intuit” and “intuition” throughout this paper as non-factive. For example, I argue that we intuit that our 
introspective judgments about sensory experience are infallible, but I am not committed to such judgments actually 
being infallible. 
  
1.  Impenetrability 
 
When an agent views a solidly colored red patch, light enters her eyes, strikes the rods 
and cones of the retina, and a neural signal is transmitted into her brain.  The brain processes 
these neural signals and, under normal conditions, engenders a reddish sensory experience.  I 
shall suppose the reddishness of this experience to be either a functional, neural, or physical 
property of the brain, but I shall remain agnostic as to which and refer to such properties simply 
as “non-phenomenal.”  Upon introspecting her sensory experience, the agent classifies it, 
forming the introspective judgment this is a reddish experience. This introspective judgment is 
formed by a sub-doxastic process, in which the agent’s mind sub-doxastically apprehends or 
recognizes the signature of the non-phenomenal property of reddishness, forms the judgment 
classifying the experience as reddish based on this apprehension, and then makes that judgment 
available to consciousness. Although the agent is consciously aware that she forms the 
introspective judgment that her experience is reddish, she in the dark both with respect to the 
nature of the sub-doxastic processes of her brain responsible for engendering the judgment, and 
with respect to the true nature of the non-phenomenal (functional, neural, or physical) property 
of reddishness sub-doxastically apprehended. That information is not available to consciousness. 
Let us refer to this phenomenon as “Impenetrability.” 
 
IMPENETRABILITY:  
 
An introspective judgment is impenetrable iff the agent is consciously aware that she 
forms it, but she lacks conscious access both with respect to the nature of the sub-
doxastic processes responsible for engendering it, as well as the true nature of the sub-
doxastically apprehended non-phenomenal property.    
 
  
While an agent can use the words “reddish” and “reddishness” when classifying her experience 
as reddish to refer to the non-phenomenal property of reddishness, she remains fundamentally 
ignorant of the true nature of reddishness.  She lacks introspective access to the details of the 
sub-doxastically apprehended property’s complex relational and fully effable 
functional/neural/physical nature.  
 Not only do we form introspective judgments classifying our sensory experiences, but we 
also form introspective judgments differentiating them. For example, an agent viewing a partially 
red and partially green colored patch simultaneously has different types of sensory experiences, 
some reddish, some greenish, corresponding to the red and green parts of the patch.  She 
classifies these sensory experiences differently and is consciously aware of the difference in 
classification, despite knowing nothing about the genuine differences between these types of 
experiences.  She cannot learn introspectively about the specific ways in which the fully effable 
and relational non-phenomenal properties apprehended sub-doxastically differ. That information 
is not available to consciousness.  
Here's a somewhat metaphorical way of summing up the foregoing claims. 
Consciousness receives “reports,” as it were, from sub-doxastic mental processes, stating how 
various experiences are to be classified and distinguished by type. Suppose that an agent’s 
reddish and greenish experiences differ with respect to various neural properties. The report that 
the agent’s conscious mind receives omits all the details with respect to the mechanisms by 
which the different neural signatures or neural patterns of these reddish and greenish experiences 
have been recognized, classified, and differentiated by her brain, and the specifics of how these 
reddish and greenish experiences differ neurally.  The conscious mind is informed only the 
upshot of the sub-doxastically carried out information processing: how to name and classify 
various experiences, which experiences are distinguishable from others by type, and which are of 
the same type.  Despite the omission of details and specifics, consciousness accepts the reports it 
receives as true—and as I’ll argue in section 2, as infallibly true. Here, we have information-
processing activities whose precise nature, while highly complex, are to be investigated and 
described by cognitive science as among the “easy” problems of consciousness.   
 It should not surprise us that introspective processes about sensory experiences would be 
impenetrable. Why should we have evolved to consciously apprehend lower-level processing 
details of brain mechanisms?  What survival advantage would that offer us?  We negotiate the 
world by knowing how sensory experiences should be classified and distinguished from others, 
not by understanding how our brains go about ascertaining this at the neural level. Furthermore, 
to apprehend the details of what our brains are carrying out sub-doxastically, we would need a 
second introspective system to apprehend the details of these sub-doxastic activities and report 
them to consciousness. To apprehend the activities of this second introspective system, a third 
introspective system would be required, ad infinitum. Unless there were an infinite number of 
introspective systems in our finite brains, we should fully expect there to be some basic, 
primitive level or levels of cognitive processing whose activities are not apprehended, monitored, 
or checked by any further system, and whose activities are therefore impenetrable or inaccessible 
to consciousness.  
 
2.  The Infallibility Intuition 
 
An agent viewing a solidly colored red patch will typically judge that the patch is red.  
She treats her judgment as fallible. Perhaps, she thinks, lighting conditions are abnormal, and she 
has misperceived the color of the patch she is viewing.  By contrast, she takes her introspective 
judgment about her sensory experience being reddish to be infallible or impervious to doubt, 
claiming absolute authority on what her experience is like. She intuits: if I introspectively judge 
that my experience is reddish, then it is. When it comes to how the color seems to her, she thinks: 
appearance is reality.   
We have the powerful intuition that our introspective judgments about the reddishness (or 
the greenishness, the yellowishness, the painfulness, etc.) of our sensory experiences are 
infallible or impervious to doubt. I call this the “Infallibility Intuition.”  
 
INFALLIBILITY INTUITION:  
 
An agent takes her introspective judgments about her sensory experiences to be infallible 
or impervious to doubt.  
 
The Infallibility Intuition is strongly anchored the folk psychological theory of the mind, 
and it is also represented in views of some philosophers who have intimated that our 
introspective judgments about our sensory experiences are in fact infallible (e.g., Descartes 
(1641)). Indeed, a plausible case could be made for infallibility by arguing that introspectively 
judging a sensory experience to be reddish is precisely what makes it reddish, especially if non-
phenomenal properties such as reddishness turn out to be functional in nature.2  However, I shall 
suppose for the sake of argument that such judgments are not infallible.  We can nevertheless 
explain why it strongly seems to us that they are due to their being highly reliable. As Daniel 
Dennett (2002) put it: 
“You can’t have infallibility about your own consciousness. Period. But you can get close — close enough 
to explain why it seems so powerfully as if you do. First of all, the intentional stance (Dennett, 1971; 1987) 
guarantees that any entity that is voluminously and reliably predictable as an intentional system will have a 
set of beliefs (including the most intimate beliefs about its doxastic experiences) that are mainly true. So 
                                               
2 A functionalist about the reddishness of a sensory experience might want to claim that the reddishness of an 
experience consists (at least in part) in the agent’s disposition, upon introspection, to utter “I am having a reddish 
experience” and to classify the currently introspected experience together with other experiences the agent had in the 
past when she viewed red objects (and then having the disposition to behave in a manner consistent with that 
classification). Hence, an agent’s classifying her sensory experience as reddish is what would make it reddish, 
regardless of how the functional property happened to be neurally realized.  Despite the prima facie appeal of this 
argument, I shall remain agnostic with respect to the question whether any introspective judgments are in fact 
infallible or whether they just strongly seem to be so.  
 
each of us can be confident that in general what we believe about our conscious experiences will have an 
interpretation according to which we are, in the main, right. How wrong could I be? Not that wrong. Not 
about most things.” 
 
If Dennett is correct, which I believe he is, in his claim that we are (at least) largely 
correct in our introspective judgments about our sensory experiences, this would suffice to 
explain why we have the infallibility intuition. I submit that there would be a powerful 
evolutionary advantage in taking our introspective judgments as infallible. Harboring doubts 
about our introspective judgments could cause us to waver in our decisions, hesitating instead of 
acting decisively to avoid danger or pursue fruitful opportunities. Moreover, a skeptical attitude 
with respect to introspective judgments would enhance fitness only if our minds possessed both 
the ability to detect errors and to correct them once detected. Such a system would surely be 
costly in evolutionary terms and would involve a radical expansion of our introspective 
capacities, necessitating a further introspective system to monitor our introspective judgments 
about sensory experiences.  In short, the evolution of such an ability, both to detect and correct 
errors, would be too costly to justify its emergence, given how rarely we are in error with respect 
to our introspective judgments about our sensory experiences.3   
We should not find it surprising that we privilege some judgments, treating them as 
impervious to doubt. Suppose, after all, we subjected all our judgments to potential doubt.  A 
sentient being treating nothing as the basic raw data of experience, the given, could fall into 
epistemological paralysis, with no safe foundation upon which to construct a stable edifice of 
belief. To create such a stable edifice, evolution would favor the emergence of minds brute-
causally reacting to introspective data, even if this might, on rare occasions, result in 
misrepresentation.  Furthermore, the potential for global doubt in our minds—where any 
                                               
3 Again, we must distinguish being in error about the color of an object we are viewing on the one hand and being in 
error about the nature of our sensory experiences (i.e., being in error about a neural or functional property of our 
sensory experience) on the other.  
 
judgment might be subjected to doubt—would present a regress problem: for every class of 
judgment, we would require a cognitive system to check the reliability of those judgments, and 
then a further system to check reliability of the judgments of that system, ad infinitum. To stop 
the regress, therefore, one should expect to encounter in the mind a most basic, primitive level of 
judgments not susceptible to doubt. Introspective judgments are plausible candidates for being 
the most basic sorts of judgments and thus treated by our minds as the infallible, given, raw data 
of experience, immune from doubt.   
Whatever ultimately explains the Infallibility Intuition—the genuine infallibility of such 
introspective judgments, their mere high level of reliability, or some evolutionary story—the 
theory of the illusion of phenomenal consciousness I elaborate here does not hinge on why we 
have the intuition or whether the intuition is correct. It requires only that we have the intuition, 
and I think that we do.4      
 
3.  The Justification Intuition 
I posit that we have a powerful intuition I shall call the “Justification Intuition,” an 
epistemic constraint on judgment/belief. For any agent a judging that p, it must seem to a that 
she is justified in judging that p at the time she judges that p. Thus, the patent 
absurdity/incoherence of a saying or thinking the following:  
 
p, but I have no reason to judge/hold/believe p   
                                               
4 We lack the Infallibility Intuition with respect to non-introspective judgments. For example, we may initially see 
an individual from a distance and judge that we see person A, a friend, but on closer inspection we realize it is 
person B, an enemy. It was crucial to our survival throughout our evolution that we be open to belief revision and 
treat these judgments as fallible.  Likewise, the non-introspective judgment that a solidly colored object is red is 
treated as fallible because we can sometimes misperceive colors when seen in unusual viewing conditions.  We 
regard these judgments with a degree of skepticism when we have reason to believe our perceptions may be in error, 
and we can take remedial action by looking at the object from a different angle or under different lighting different 
conditions, etc.  By contrast, we intuit (whether we are right or wrong to do this) that the process of determining 
how a solid color seems to us, the introspective judgment about our own sensory experience, cannot go wrong.  
 Agent a would contradict herself, thinking something incoherent.  She would not really judge 
that p if it seemed to her that she lacked justification for her judgment at the time she so judges. 
Judgments and putative or felt supporting justification/evidence/reasons for it are necessary 
companions.   
 
JUSTIFICATION INTUITION5 6   
For any agent a judging that p, a intuits that she is justified in judging that p at the time 
she judges that p. 
 
   
This is not to say we can always correctly identify the reasons or evidence we take 
ourselves to possess for any judgment or belief. We are frequently bad at identifying these. Nor 
do I suggest that reasons, evidence, or other forms of justification must in fact exist for our 
judgments.  We often possess the intuition that there is some reason or other, when there is in 
fact nothing at all supporting a judgment.  And even where we identify some reason r for judging 
that p, I do not mean to suggest that r must support the judgment in fact. Reason r could be 
irrelevant to the truth or falsity of p, or pseudo-justificatory.  Instead, I am making the far more 
modest claim that in every case of judging, we feel or intuit the existence of some justification to 
back up our judgment. Having such an intuition of justification is what separates a bona fide act 
                                               
5 Setiya (2008) suggests a similar epistemic constraint on belief (in the context of discussing Bernard Williams’ 
(1976) argument that you cannot intentionally decide to believe a proposition for which it seems to you that you lack 
sufficient evidence):   
 
It is impossible to believe that p or to be confident that p while believing that this degree of confidence or 
belief is not epistemically justified. 
 
See also Gibbons (2005): “If you think about Moore-paradoxical statements from the normative perspective, then 
the same kind of incoherence that is involved in the standard cases also seems to infect the following: p, but I have 
no reason to believe that p…” 
 
6 This constraint does not apply to the sorts of judgments we might better refer to as statements of opinion, which 
are non-truth-apt.  
of judging from an empty mouthing of words.7 An agent who felt her judgment to be arbitrary 
and unjustified would ipso facto not stand behind it, and thus not judge at all.   
Perhaps, then, we can say that it is conceptually impossible to judge that p and 
simultaneously think I have no reason to judge that p.8  If a judgment without putative 
justification is conceptually impossible, it should not be surprising that we have the intuition that 
every judgment is accompanied by justification. Our intuition would track this conceptual truth. 
And even if I were wrong about this being a conceptual truth—if it turned out after all to be 
conceivable that one might judge that p without intuiting any justification for one’s judgment—I 
suspect that having the Justification Intuition would be fitness enhancing and we should 
therefore expect to find, on evolutionary grounds, that the intuition guides our doxastic 
dispositions, although I shall not speculate about this matter here.  
 
4.  The Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness 
My central claim is that qualia, a.k.a. phenomenal properties, are putative properties 
whose instantiation in our minds we take to justify our introspective judgments about our sensory 
experiences.  
QUALIA: Putative properties whose instantiation in our minds we take to justify our 
introspective judgments about our sensory experiences.  
 
                                               
7 Such intuited justifications, when we undertake to articulate then, are often expressed with statements as weak as 
“it strongly seems to be the case,” “it feels to me to be that way though I cannot say why,” or “it is self-evident.”  
The point is not that we have the ready capacity to identify and articulate some genuinely cogent justification for our 
judgments, but only that we feel or intuit the present of such justifications upon forming a judgment as an inherent 
part of the act of judging. 
 
8 I do not mean to suggest that we are incapable of entertaining philosophical doubt with respect to our judgments or 
beliefs. If I judge that p, I intuit that my judgment is justified, but this does not exclude the possibility that I may 
intellectually, using powers of higher reason, come to doubt that my reasons for judging that p are cogent or 
compelling. In any case, any such cases of higher-level doubt would not typically be simultaneous with the 
judgment, and moreover, the act of doubt would not be within same module of the mind in which the judgment was 
formed.  
  
In subsection (I) I explain why we intuit that qualia are instantiated in our minds.  In 
subsection (II), I explain why we take ourselves to directly apprehend these instantiated qualia.  
In subsection (III), I explain why we take our experiences to be “like something.”  In subsection 
(IV), I explain our disposition to attribute ineffability, intrinsicality, and subjectivity to our 
experiences. In subsection (V), I discuss the evidence in support of my claim that the issue of 
justification is central to explaining the Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness.  In section (VI), I 
explain why the folk take illusionism to be counterintuitive.  In section (VII), I defend the theory 
of the illusion presented herein from the objection that the illusion of phenomenal consciousness 
would itself be a representation with its own phenomenal properties in need of explaining away.  
   
(I)    Why we take qualia—putative properties justifying our introspective 
judgments about our sensory experiences—to be instantiated in our minds.  
 
Through rational reconstructions of our intuitive judgment processes with respect to 
introspective judgment tokens IJR and IJG9 set out below (“IJR and “IJG” standing for 
“Introspective Judgment Reddish” and “Introspective Judgment Greenish,” respectively), I shall 
illustrate why we take qualia to be instantiated in our minds. 
 
IJR:  This is a reddish experience  
IJG:  This is a greenish experience  
 
Note that in the rational reconstructions below, the word “I” refers exclusively to the personal-
level, doxastic-level, conscious agent, and it excludes the sub-personal, sub-doxastic, infra-
conscious, impenetrable processes at work in the agent’s brain.  Also note that I am not claiming 
that these rational reconstructions represent the thought process of any agent—that would over-
                                               
9 It is important to note that IJR and IJG are introspective judgment tokens, i.e., particular acts of judging.   
intellectualize matters. These rational reconstructions are meant rather to capture what is 
happening on the level of intuition from the agent’s first-person perspective.  
 
 
 IJR: Rational Reconstruction 
 
 (i) IJR is true  →  There is a property instantiated in my mind—call it  
“PReddishness”—justifying judgment IJR. 
[from the JUSTIFICATION INTUITION] 
 
(ii) I infallibly know that IJR is true.  
  [(from the INFALLIBILITY INTUITION)] 
 
(iii) Therefore, I infallibly know that PReddishness is instantiated in my mind. 
 
  
 
IJG: Rational Reconstruction 
(i) IJG is true  →  There is a property instantiated in my mind—call it  
“PGreenishness”—justifying judgment IJG. 
[from the JUSTIFICATION INTUITION] 
 
(ii) I infallibly know that IJG is true.  
  [(from the INFALLIBILITY INTUITION)] 
  
(iii) Therefore, I infallibly know that PGreenishness is instantiated in my mind. 
 
 
I shall now clarify the premises and the conclusions in these rational reconstructions, beginning 
with premise (i).  That premise comes from the Justification Intuition. Again, the Justification 
Intuition says that an agent will intuit that every judgment she forms is justified at the time she 
forms it. Hence, if an agent has judged her experience to be reddish, it must seem to her that 
there is something about her experience in virtue of which she is justified in judging it to be 
reddish. (By reductio, if it seemed to her that there were nothing about her experience in virtue 
of which her judgment that it was reddish was justified, her judgment would seem to her to be 
arbitrary and unjustified.) To say that “there is something about her experience” in virtue of 
which it seems to her that she is justified in judging it to be reddish is precisely to say that it 
seems to her that there is some property of her experience in virtue of which she is justified in 
her judgment that the experience is reddish.  Let us call this property PReddishness for judgments 
than an experience is reddish, and PGreenishness for judgments that an experience is greenish. An 
agent takes her judgments to be justified if and only if it seems to her that these justificatory 
properties are instantiated in her mind at the time she forms the judgments.  I claim that these 
putative justificatory properties such as PReddishness and PGreenishness are qualia, or phenomenal 
properties.10  
Premise (ii) in the rational reconstructions above follows from the Infallibility Intuition, 
according to which an agent takes all her introspective judgments about sensory experience to be 
infallibly true.  
                                               
 
10 I posit that these phenomenal properties are putatively “exclusively justifying,” meaning that, e.g., the instantiation 
of PReddishness would seem to us to exclusively justify judgments of the type this experience is reddish, and foreclose 
any judgments of different types, such as, e.g., this experience is greenish.  And the instantiation of PGreenishness would 
seem to us to exclusively justify judgments of the type this experience is greenish, and foreclose any judgments with 
different content, such as, e.g., this experience is reddish.   
 
EXCLUSIVELY JUSTIFYING PROPERTY 
 
A property is exclusively justifying if its instantiation guarantees the truth of one judgment type alone, and 
categorically excludes the truth of any other judgment types.  
 
The putative infallibility of introspective judgments entails that phenomenal properties are exclusively justifying 
properties. We can see this by reductio. Suppose hypothetically that a putatively instantiated justificatory 
phenomenal property, PReddishness, justified the introspective judgment this experience is reddish, but that there were a 
slight chance that instantiation of PReddishness could also justify the judgment this experience is greenish. If this were 
the case, then we could not see our judgment that the experience is reddish as infallible, for we could not exclude the 
possibility, based on verifying that PReddishness is instantiated in our mind, that our judgment had the content this 
experience is greenish.  If we deem our introspective judgment as infallible, the justification we have for that 
judgment cannot be seemingly equivocal, such that it would appear to us an open question as to whether some other 
judgment type could be true based on the instantiation of the justifying property. That would be inconsistent with 
infallibility. Infallibility requires rather that the apprehension of a particular sort of evidence guarantees that a 
particular type of introspective judgment is true, and categorically excludes the truth of other types of judgments. 
Thus, for each putatively justificatory property backing any judgment, we take the justificatory property as justifying 
that judgment alone and not potentially justifying any other sort of judgment.  We take PReddishness as exclusively 
justifying introspective judgments of the type this is a reddish experience, and PGreenishness exclusively justifying 
introspective judgments of the type this is a greenish experience. 
The Justification and Infalliblity intuitions, embodied in premises (i) and (ii) of the 
rational reconstructions, together entail the conclusion, (iii), according to which any agent 
forming an introspective judgment about her sensory experience takes herself to know infallibly 
that a justificatory phenomenal property such as PReddishness or PGreenishness is instantiated in her 
mind.  
 
 
(II) Why do qualia seem directly apprehensible? 
 In the above subsection, I argued that when we introspect our sensory experiences we 
intuit that we infallibly know that justificatory phenomenal properties, putatively justifying our 
introspective judgments about these sensory experiences, are instantiated.  That was the 
conclusion of the rational reconstructions. What is missing thus far is an explanation for why it 
seems to us that we directly apprehend these phenomenal properties. Phenomenal properties 
seem to present themselves to us immediately and directly without any initiative or mental effort 
by our minds. We do not experience ourselves as having to actively reflect and effortfully 
introspect to see that these properties are instantiated.  
Let us say that a property is directly apprehensible iff no effortful reflection or chain of 
inferences, except for a simple logical inference from premises deemed to be infallibly known or 
self-evident, is required to (seemingly) infallibly verify the instantiation of the property 
whenever it is instantiated.  
 
DIRECT APPRHENSIBILITY 
A property seems directly apprehensible iff no effortful reflection or chain of inferences, 
except for a simple logical inference from premises deemed to be infallibly known or 
self-evident, is required to (seemingly) infallibly verify the instantiation of the property 
whenever it is instantiated.   
 
We judge qualia to be directly apprehensible according to this definition, and the instant theory 
explains why.  Consider again the rational reconstruction of our intuitive reasoning processes 
with respect to introspective judgment token IJR, reproduced below: 
 
IJR: Rational Reconstruction 
 
 (i) IJR is true  →  There is a property instantiated in my mind—call it  
“PReddishness”—justifying judgment IJR. 
[from the JUSTIFICATION INTUITION] 
(ii) I infallibly know that IJR is true.  
  [(from the INFALLIBILITY INTUITION)] 
 
(iii) Therefore, I infallibly know that PReddishness is instantiated in my mind. 
 
 
We treat premises (i) and (ii) as infallibly known, for they embody principles—the Infallibility 
and Justification Intuitions—which are integral parts of the way we conceptualize the world.  
They have the status of conceptual truths for us. From those two premises, conclusion (iii), 
according to which we infallibly know that a justificatory property, PReddishness, is instantiated in 
the mind, follows by a simple logical inference.  Hence, we directly apprehend PReddishness 
according to the above definition of direct apprehensibility.  
Consider the absurdity of thinking the following:  
 
I am certain that IJR is true, and I am certain that if IJR is true, necessarily property 
PReddishness is instantiated in my mind, but I must effortfully reflect on whether PReddishness is 
instantiated in my mind.  
 
To think this would be absurd.  From the fact that I intuit that my introspective judgment IJR is 
doubtlessly true, it follows logically and immediately, per the Justification Intuition, that 
PReddishness is instantiated in my mind.  No reflection is required to reach this conclusion.11 The 
justifying phenomenal property’s instantiation appears to me equally as doubtless and certain as 
the truth of the classifying introspective judgment I take its instantiation to justify.  
 
 
(III) Why do we judge that our sensory experiences to be “like something”? 
Thus far, I have argued in subsection (I) that we intuit that there are justificatory 
properties supporting our judgments instantiated in us, and these are qualia, a.k.a. phenomenal 
properties. Moreover, in subsection (II) I have explained why it seems that we directly apprehend 
these instantiated properties. But why do we experience our sensory experiences as being like 
something? I’ll now turn to this crucial question.  
As I have claimed above, I take properties PReddishness and PGreenishness to justify different 
judgment types, the former (exclusively12) justifying judgments of the type this experience is 
reddish, and the latter judgments of the type this experience is greenish.  PReddishness and 
PGreenishness must seem different to me, and this can be shown by the following reductio. Suppose 
that PReddishness and PGreenishness did not seem different to me. I would not be able to tell them apart. 
Thus, it would seem to me that the very same evidence could be the basis for judging either that 
an experience was reddish or greenish. Now, suppose I judged a particular experience to be 
reddish. How could I feel that this judgment was justified if the evidence seemed to me to 
equally well support the judgment that my experience was greenish?  My judgment either way—
either that the experience was reddish or greenish—would be experienced by me as an arbitrary 
choice between two equally good alternatives, essentially a stab in the dark.  However, the 
                                               
11 And consider, hypothetically, that I did need to pause to reflect if my judgment about my sensory experience was 
justified; that in and of itself would be a form of doubt, a wavering of sorts, which would be inconsistent the Strong 
Infallibility Intuition.  
  
12 See footnote 10, supra, for why I claim these phenomenal properties would be taken to exclusively justify their 
respective judgment types.  
Justification Intuition bars me from seeing my judgments as arbitrary or unjustified. Therefore, 
the justificatory properties for my judgments of different types, such as PReddishness and PGreenishness, 
must seem different to me.  
The Infallibility Intuition also explains why PReddishness and PGreenishness must seem different 
to me. If the same evidence could result in judgments of various types, such judgments would 
not strike me as infallible. Again, suppose that the same evidence could be the basis for judging 
either that an experience was reddish or greenish, and suppose I ended up judging a particular 
experience of mine to be reddish. How could I feel that this judgment was correct if the evidence 
seemed to me to equally well support the judgment that the experience was greenish?  My 
judgment either way—either that the experience was reddish or greenish—would be experienced 
by me as an arbitrary choice between two equally good alternatives, a stab in the dark. Therefore, 
the judgment would not seem to me to be infallibly true.  But I do experience my introspective 
judgments as infallibly true. So PReddishness and PGreenishness must seem different to me.  
In short, the combined force of the Justification and Infalliblity intuitions entails that 
PReddishness and PGreenishness must seem different to me.  Since they seem different to me, each 
putative phenomenal property, considered individually, must seem like something.  PReddishness 
must seem like one thing, and PGreenishness like another.  For consider the absurdity of saying or 
thinking: 
 
PReddishness and PGreenishness seem different to me, but neither PReddishness nor PGreenishness,  
considered individually, seems like anything to me.  
 
The above is absurd, incoherent.  Two entities that seem different to me cannot be such that I see 
them as not being like anything considered individually. It is a conceptual truth that if I see two 
things as distinct, I must see each individually as being like something, such that, as it were, the 
something the one seems like is not identical to the something the other seems like.  Thus, 
PReddishness seems like something, and PGreenishness seems like something else. Each of those 
putative phenomenal justificatory properties is tied to my reddish and greenish sensory 
experiences and to the introspective judgments I form about them. This explains why my reddish 
and greenish experiences appear to have distinct what-it’s-likenesses.  
 Now, phenomenal properties such as PReddishness and PGreenishness do not exist and are never 
in fact instantiated. Hence, neither of these justificatory properties is really distinct from the 
other, nor is either individually like anything. I consciously apprehend only the bare fact that 
reddish and greenish experiences are distinct (even if, sub-doxastically, my brain discerns a 
genuine difference in the non-phenomenal properties of reddish and greenish experiences). How 
I think about these nonexistent phenomenal properties is governed by the same logic governing 
how I would think about existent properties.  I would not distinguish between two existent 
properties or entities unless it seems to me that I discerned a difference, unless each seemed to 
me to be “like” something different, meaning that each seemed like something  considered on its 
own. Therefore, it also seems to me that the non-existent phenomenal properties PReddishness and 
PGreenishness each seems like something considered on its own.   
  
 
(IV) Why do we attribute Ineffability, Intrinsicality, and Subjectivity to our  
experiences?  
  
Why do we attribute the three characteristics of classic qualia Frankish (2012) 
identifies—intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity—to our experiences?   
a. Ineffability   
According to the theory I have elaborated above, we cannot put what phenomenal 
reddishness is like into words because, in fact, the property does not exist, even though, for 
reasons elaborated above, the property seems to us to exist, to be directly apprehensible, and 
seems to be “like” something.  Of course, there are indeed justificatory properties backing our 
introspective judgments about sensory experience, but these are non-phenomenal properties. 
However, due Impenetrability, we can say nothing about them via introspection. They are not 
available to consciousness.  
b. Intrinsicality  
By “intrinsic,” I mean non-relational. There are two ways for a property to be non-
relational.   
The first way of being non-relational I shall call internal non-relationality.  An internally 
non-relational property is atomic and simple, meaning that it has no describable or discernable 
parts.  Without parts, there can be no description of the property in terms of the relation of the 
parts to one another. An example of an internally relational property would be circularity. A 
circle has parts and various discernable elements. We have the radius, the circumference, and the 
various points making up the circle, which are related to one another in space according to 
mathematical description.  Now, unlike circularity, which is a genuine property, phenomenal 
reddishness does not exist. Hence, phenomenal reddishness, being non-existent, cannot have 
parts.  Of course, we might fictionally imagine of a non-existent entity that it had parts.  But we 
do not, as a matter of fact, do this with reddishness. If you reflect on reddishness and try to 
discern any parts, you will fail.  Our minds do not invent an intricate story about reddishness 
having parts, and in this sense the illusion of phenomenal consciousness is a minimalist illusion: 
no illusory details of what phenomenal properties are like are represented, even fictionally.  
The second sort of non-relationality we may call external non-relationality. A property 
that is externally non-relational is has no discernable relational properties with respect to any 
other property, object, or individual outside of it. Phenomenal properties such as phenomenal 
reddishness seem to lack these sorts of external relational properties. This is reflected in the 
folk’s13 intuition in the inverted spectrum thought experiment, where the folk intuit that a 
spectrum inversion would be conceivable yet undetectable. It would be undetectable, per the 
folk, because no relational property could ever be articulated to ascertain whether two 
individuals had their phenomenal spectra inverted. Thus, relational properties, such as facts 
about what sorts of memories or feeling two individuals might associate with phenomenal color 
sensations, have no bearing on whether the phenomenal colors are inverted. If for me reddishness 
is associated with hot and my bluishness with cold, and you have the exact opposite associations, 
this is, per folk intuitions, insufficient to ascertain whether there is an inversion. Affter all, you 
might experience the raw feel of reddishness, just as I do, but you simply associate different 
things with that raw feeling.  Conversely, we can conceive of the possibility that your qualia are 
inverted but your associations with those qualia are inverted as well. Either way, what one 
associates with one’s qualia, per folk intuitions, do not settle the matter. What is intuitively 
significant is only what your experience subjectively and inwardly seems like to you, not how 
you react, what you say, what other properties you associate with individual qualia, or any other 
sort of external reaction to the experience. Phenomenal properties seem intrinsic: we cannot get 
at them, identify them, ascertain their essences, in terms of relational properties.     
What explains why we take phenomenal properties to be intrinsic in this second sense, as 
externally non-relational? Impenetrability explains it. The complex relational properties of the 
non-phenomenal properties, which is apprehended sub-doxastically, cannot be seen by the 
                                               
13 I include proponents of illusionism among the folk.  Even those philosophers who think illusionism is true, such as 
I, continue to have powerful non-illusionist intuitions. It is just that, for philosophical reasons, proponents of 
illusionism do not trust these intuitions. These intuitions never go away no matter what position one may take on the 
reality (or unreality) of phenomenal consciousness.  
conscious mind.  At the conscious level, we receive a report from the sub-doxastic mind, saying 
that the experience is reddish, but no further details are received.  Reddishness is experienced at 
the conscious level as a mere that, with the label “reddish” attached.  Of course, given that this 
label is supposed to distinguish this property from greenishness and all other experience types, it 
must seem to us that reddishness is like something specific, unlike that specific thing that 
greenishness or yellowishness or pain is like. As elaborated above, if we did not see the 
properties putatively evidencing our distinct judgments as distinct, and each being like 
something, all our judgments differentiating various sensory experiences would strike us as 
arbitrary and unjustified. Thus, the mind experiences an intuition/feeling of reddishness having a 
specific nature, even though there are no details filled in. The result is the intuition that we 
experience an intrinsic property: one that has its own very specific nature, but whose specific 
nature is not constituted by its relation to anything else (either outside of it or inside of it).  The 
specific nature of the property seems unspecifiable simpliciter, or ineffable. 
c. Subjectivity 
 Whereas an objective property/fact is one that can be recognized to obtain by any agent, 
regardless of the agent’s perspective, a subjective property/fact is one that can be recognized 
only from a particular perspective.  The folk’s intuition in the inverted spectrum case is that 
phenomenal properties are subjective entities. The folk’s intuition is that no inter-subjectual 
comparison between my reddish and greenish experiences, and yours, is possible. Hence, it is per 
se impossible ever to know whether the spectra are inverted. Despite this, there is supposed to be 
some fact of the matter—a subjective fact—about whether the spectra are inverted.  
Now, there is simply no such thing as a subjective fact. Why do we intuit that facts about 
phenomenal properties, facts about our experiences, are subjective?  Part of the explanation is 
that since those putative phenomenal properties are seemingly both intrinsic and ineffable, we 
have no way to individuate them or differentiate between them except by experiencing them on 
introspection. And introspection is, as a conceptual matter, essentially bound to a single 
introspecting subject. Only I can introspect my experiences. You cannot do experience my 
experiences. If you could experience them, introspect on them, at that moment of joint 
introspection we would be one subject, rather than two distinct subjects. At least, this is my 
intuition, and I suspect it is the intuition of the folk as well.  
Since we take phenomenal properties to be revealed and knowable only through acts of 
introspection, which distinct subjects cannot carry out jointly or share, distinct subject cannot 
exchange information about what these phenomenal properties are like.  Thus, we judge that 
phenomenal properties are knowable only to a lone, single subject.  
 
(V) What is the evidence that the issue of Justification is central to explaining the  
Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness? 
 
I claim that the issue of justification is the key to the mystery as to why we take our 
experiences to be like something.  After all, the Justification and Infalliblity intuitions, which are 
central elements of my theory, are epistemic notions relating to the notion of justification of 
judgment/belief.   
Here is a consideration I take to militate in favor of my claim that the issue of 
justification is the key to the explanation of the illusion of phenomanl consciousness:  If we are 
asked to say how we know our experience is reddish, or how we know we are in pain, we say 
“because it seems reddish to me” or “it seems painful to me.” We allude to the instantiation of a 
putative phenomenal property as the evidence/justification for our introspective judgments. I see 
this as powerful evidence that the putative phenomenal property is there to fill a “justificatory 
gap,” as it were, arising out of the Impenetrability of the introspective judgments, a gap between 
the genuine justificatory process our minds apprehend only sub-doxastically on the one hand, 
and a putative phenomenal property we take to be the justificatory property on the other. 14  The 
gap is filled because the Justification Intuition disposes us to expect conscious apprehension of 
the evidence for our introspective judgments.  The putative phenomenal property allows our 
minds to make sense of their judging activities. Without imagining that there exist phenomenal 
properties, our introspective judgments would appear to us to be senseless and arbitrary.15  
 
(VI) Why does illusionism strike the folk as counterintuitive?   
If we take these non-existent phenomenal properties as justifying our introspective 
judgments, as I claim, we should not find it surprising that the folk find illusionism absurd.  For 
illusionism posits that what we take as the justification for our introspective judgments is non-
existent. Therefore, Illusionism seems to call into question the reliability of our introspective 
judgments, judgments which we take to be infallible. Thus, illusionism clashes directly with the 
Infallibility Intuition, and therefore seems counterintuitive.  
Of course, the unreality of the phenomenal states we posit as justifications for our 
introspective judgments does not really call the reliability of these introspective judgments into 
question, since with every introspective judgment our brains reliably (although not infallibly) 
apprehend a non-phenomenal property sub-doxastically. It is just that because of Impenetrability, 
                                               
14 Indirectly, in referring to the non-existent phenomenal property, we are in fact referring to the underlying non-
phenomenal property forming the genuine justificatory basis of the introspective judgment. 
 
15 Importantly, again, the property we allude to is not the real justification—it is not what really justifies us in our 
judgments, but only what we fancy justifies them because while the Justification Intuition demands we apprehend a 
justification, at the same time Impenetrability prevents us from providing a genuine justification because we cannot 
see the true causes, the brain activities, and the non-phenomenal properties they sub-doxastically apprehend, 
engendering the judgment. 
 
we fail to know anything about that non-phenomenal property. We seem to see instead an Ersatz 
phenomenal property (and by “Ersatz” I mean something like the original German meaning: 
stand-in, substitute, surrogate, or replacement for the real thing). If Impenetrability were not the 
case, we would be able to directly see the genuine justifications for our introspective judgments 
about our sensory experiences. But given impenetrability, we are stuck with apprehending 
fictional Ersatz justifications for our judgments. The conscious mind must make do with a stand-
in property, the ghostly shadow of the non-phenomenal property we cannot consciously 
apprehend.  
 
(VII)  The Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness Involves no Misrepresentation 
 Derk Pereboom, himself sympathetic to illusionism, points out a worry for Illusionism in 
his 2016 (185).    
 
“… Illusionists agree that the what-it’s-like features of sensory states, what I call the qualitative natures of 
phenomenal properties, are illusory in that they don’t exist. But what of the illusion itself? Experiencing 
an illusion requires that the illusions themselves, which are kinds of introspective representations, 
will exist. ... However, these illusions themselves will have phenomenal properties, or so it would 
seem. ... Accordingly, the objector may claim that there will be something it’s like to have an illusion 
of phenomenal greenness, and it’s the same as what it’s like have a sensation of green. If this is right, 
then the illusionist’s strategy won’t get us very far (see Pereboom, 1994, pp. 582–4; Alter, 1995; and 
Chalmers, 1996, p. 142, for versions of this objection). [Bolds mine] 
 
To sum up Pereboom’s worry: even if my phenomenal reddish state is not like something, my 
misrepresentation of it as being like something must itself be like something.   
The theory I propose is immune from Pereboom’s worry, because on my theory, the 
illusion of phenomenal consciousness is not a “kind of introspective representation.”  The 
illusion involves no representation or misrepresentation at all.  The illusion is constituted rather 
by a set of dispositions to draw false inferences, to posit non-existent properties that are 
ineffable, intrinsic, subjective, directly apprehensible, and “like something.” But there is no 
representation of how one phenomenal property is different from any other, not even fictionally. 
If there were such a representation, we would be able to say something about how this difference 
is represented to us.  We have the mere conviction that there are differences, without 
representing any.  
Consider an optical illusion, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion. This sort of illusion is not 
constituted merely by a conviction.  With the Müller-Lyer illusion, we can describe the 
misrepresentation:  the mind misrepresents lines of equal lengths as being of different lengths. 
The lines being of different lengths is a genuinely conceivable states-of-affairs. But how does the 
mind represent reddishness as being different from greenishness? It doesn’t. That’s why we have 
ineffability—if a difference were represented, we could say what the difference consisted in.  
The mind is simply convinced there is a difference it apprehends, but it does not represent that 
difference.  
To construe the illusions posited by illusionism as consisting in (mis)representations is to 
fail to recognize the strength of  strong illusionism’s commitment to the non-existence of 
phenomenal properties. According to illusionism, phenomenal properties are far more robustly 
unreal than Sherlock Holmes, who even though non-existent, is fictionally depicted in his 
fictional world as having identifiable and describable features. A reddish experience is like 
nothing whatsoever, not even fictionally in the mind of an agent subject to the illusion.  That is 
why I draw a total blank when asked to describe what reddishness is. I do not represent of the 
experience as being like anything.  I just have the raw but extremely powerful conviction the 
experience is like something, and different from what a greenish experience is like. An illusion 
without misrepresentation can be just as strong as an illusion that misrepresents (and perhaps 
even stronger).  If the theory I present herein is true, the illusion of phenomenal consciousness is 
quite different in nature from optical illusions, which always involve misrepresentations. Perhaps 
the illusion of phenomenal consciousness is sui generis.16  
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